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INTRODUCTION 
Federal courts currently disagree about the scope of criminal liability 
under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (hereinafter “MBTA” or “Act”). 
The controversy involves the meaning of the word “take” and whether 
it applies to legal, commercial activity not directed at harming birds. 
The issue has recently arisen in the oil and gas context, where the 
question is whether an oil pit can “take” a migratory bird in the course 
of its ordinary, regulated, use. 
Many sources can be used to inform the proper scope of MBTA 
liability, including the history of the legislation, the text and plain 
language of the statute, and case law from the lower courts. This paper 
will discuss the different possible interpretations of the MBTA, arguing 
that oil pit operators should be held strictly liable for taking and killing 
migratory birds in the course of their operations. 
Part I introduces the relevant statutory text. Part II explores the 
current Federal Circuit Court split in interpreting the Act. Part III 
analyzes why the Citgo1 court properly interpreted the MBTA to apply 
to oil pits that take and kill birds during the course of their normal, 
regulated activity by looking to the history, text, and purpose of the 
Act. Part IV dispels any concerns about unconstitutional or 
inappropriate application by arguing that vigorous proximate cause 
analysis and prosecutorial discretion work to ensure absurd results do 
not occur. The article concludes that to permit oil companies’ 
operations to continue to capture and kill birds, albeit inadvertently, is 
contrary to the express purpose of Congress and that in order for the 
MBTA to have any meaning, it must be interpreted to apply to those 
 
1 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841 (S.D. Tex. 2012) rev’d, 
2015 WL 5201185 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015). 
CARUSELLO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:34 AM 
2015] Can an Oil Pit Take a Bird?: Why the Migratory Bird 89 
Treaty Act Should Apply to Inadvertent Takings and Killings 
by Oil Pits 
whose operations are the proximate cause of “takings” and “killings” 
of migratory birds. 
The MBTA’s purpose is to protect migratory birds, not just to protect 
them from acts directed at harming them. Courts should interpret 
MBTA liability to apply when migratory bird deaths occur as a result 
of oil pit operations. 
I 
THE MBTA 
The MBTA provision at issue reads: 
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter 
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by any 
means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt 
to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, 
barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment, ship, export, 
import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported, deliver for 
transportation, transport or cause to be transported, carry or cause to 
be carried, or receive for shipment, transportation, carriage, or export, 
any migratory bird, any part, nest, or egg of any such bird, or any 
product, whether or not manufactured, which consists, or is 
composed in whole or part, of any such bird or any part, nest, or egg 
thereof, included in the terms of the conventions . . .2 
Within the meaning of the MBTA, “migratory birds” includes 
“many of the most numerous and least endangered species one can 
imagine.”3 The U.S. Department of the Interior lists almost all species 
of North American birds as migratory birds, including crows, grackles, 
and pigeons.4 No de minimis exception appears to apply, because the 
MBTA makes unlawful the taking of any single migratory bird.5 The 
 
2 16 U.S.C.A. § 703 (West 2004). 
3 Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
4 See George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and Expansion 
of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 190 (1979) (“The MBTA now 
protects nearly all native birds in the country, of which there are millions if not billions, so 
there is no end to the possibilities for an arguable violation.”). For a complete listing of 
protected migratory birds, see 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (1997). 
5 “[I]f . . . the MBTA prohibits the inadvertently-caused death of any migratory bird . . . 
land uses on tens of millions of acres would be impaired.” Timber Appellees’ Brief at 2, 
Newton County Wildlife Assn., 113 F.3d 110 (No. 96-3463) [hereinafter Timber Appellees’ 
Brief]. See also Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited 
Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 842 (1998). 
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key statutory language is: “[I]t shall be unlawful at any time, by any 
means or in any manner, to . . . take . . . any migratory bird.”6 
The question that courts are currently grappling with is whether in 
the context of the MBTA “take” refers exclusively to conduct directed 
at harming birds, such as hunting and poaching, or whether it is 
intended to include acts or omissions that merely have the incidental 
effect of causing bird deaths. As the plain language of the text helps 
illuminate, the MBTA cannot be interpreted to apply only to intentional 
harmful conduct. 
In United States v. Corrow,7 the Tenth Circuit joined the majority of 
Circuit Courts of Appeal in holding that section 707(a) of the MBTA 
creates a strict liability crime.8 This means that it is not necessary to 
prove that the defendant intended to violate the MBTA. In other words, 
the defendant does not need to intended or acted with the purpose to 
“take” or “kill” the birds, or even have done so negligently; the taking 
or killing must simply have occurred.9 
The fact that Congress made MBTA violations strict liability crimes 
further indicates that it was not Congress’s objective to limit liability 
to intentionally harmful acts toward birds. The MBTA certainly 
reaches conduct beyond hunting, including oil pit deaths. 
II 
CURRENT FEDERAL COURT SPLIT IN INTERPRETING CRIMINAL 
LIABILITY FOR MBTA VIOLATIONS: WHAT DOES “TAKE” MEAN 
IN THE MBTA? MUST THE ACTION BE DIRECTED AT BIRDS IN 
ORDER TO CONSTITUTE A TAKING? 
Many courts have found that the MBTA is ambiguous as to when 
criminal liability attaches. The finding of ambiguity is supported by the 
aforementioned disagreement among Federal District Courts.10 The 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits have concluded that the term “kill” in the 
MBTA means physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and 
 
6 16 U.S.C.A. § 703. 
7 United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796 (10th Cir. 1997). 
8 Id. at 805. 
9 United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1073-74 (D. Colo. 
1999); see also United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1986); see also 
S. Rep. No. 99-445, at 16 (2008), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128 (“Nothing in 
this amendment is intended to alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misdemeanor 
prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. § 707(a), a standard which has been upheld by many Federal 
court decisions.”). 
10 See supra Introduction. 
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poachers.11 The Second Circuit, conversely, has determined that a 
corporation who performs an affirmative act that is not related to 
hunting but nonetheless results in the death of migratory birds, can be 
held strictly liable under the MBTA.12 
A. Oil Field Equipment Can “Take” Birds 
In 2012, in United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., the District 
Court for the Southern District of Texas held that “[i]f an operator who 
maintains a tank or pit does not take protective measures necessary to 
prevent harm to birds, the operator may incur liability under federal and 
state wildlife protection laws.”13 The court in Citgo determined that it 
was reasonably foreseeable that the operation of open oil pits would 
result in migratory bird deaths.14 The court held that oil field equipment 
can “take” birds.15 Additionally, liability for the charged conduct was 
appropriate because the defendant oil company proximately caused the 
harm to birds.16 
B. Simply Maintaining a Pit in Which Birds Die Does Not Trigger 
Liability 
In the same year, in United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., the 
District Court for the District of North Dakota held the opposite—that 
simply maintaining a pit in which birds die does not trigger liability. 
The Brigham court held that oil and gas companies’ use of reserve pits 
 
11 See Newton Cty. Wildlife Assoc. v. United States Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th 
Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991). 
12 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that “where 
corporation engaged in manufacture of pesticide known to be highly toxic and then failed to 
act to prevent dangerous chemical from reaching the pond where it was dangerous to birds 
and other living organisms that ingested or came into close contact with chemical, 
corporation did perform an affirmative “act” for which it could be held strictly liable under 
Act, even though corporation was not aware of the lethal-to-birds quality of water in its 
pond”); see also United States v. Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR 05-1516-MV, 2009 
WL 8691615 (D.N.M. Feb. 25, 2009) (concluding that “Congress intended to prohibit only 
conduct directed towards birds and did not intend to criminalize negligent acts or omissions 
that are not directed at birds, but which incidentally and proximately cause bird deaths”). 
13 United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F.Supp.2d 841, 847 (S.D. Tex. 2012), 
rev’d 2015 WL 5201185 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 848. See also United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 
2010). 
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to hold drill cuttings and oil and gas fluids accumulated during 
commercial drilling operations did not violate the MBTA prohibition 
against the “taking” or “killing” of protected migratory birds. 
The court interpreted the Act to require some intentional behavior 
directed at birds in order for liability to attach. While several birds died 
in or near the pits, the pits were directed at commercial oil production, 
not at harming birds. Even though several bird deaths occurred in or 
near the pits, since the pits were not directed at birds or their habitat 
and constituted commercial activity that only incidentally injured 
protected bird species, the court determined that Brigham Oil & Gas 
did not “take” or “kill” migratory birds within the meaning of the 
MBTA to subject them to criminal liability.17 
III 
WHY THE CITGO INTERPRETATION WAS CORRECT18 
In deciding Brigham, the court noted that it is “highly unlikely that 
Congress ever intended to impose criminal liability on the acts or 
omissions of persons involved in lawful commercial activity which 
may indirectly cause the death of birds protected under the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act.”19 
Certainly, it is true that Congress could not have meant to 
criminalize normal land use and commercial activities; however, 
maintaining oil pits is an act distinguishable from lawn mowing, timber 
harvesting, driving, skyscraper building, and other legal commercial 
activities. The actors in the oil business are knowledgeable about their 
operations and the way that birds fly into, become trapped, and die in 
their oil pits. Oil companies have been educated by the Fish and 
Wildlife Service about the harm that their pits cause to birds and how 
they can prevent them.20 Fish and Wildlife Service agents suggest to oil 
companies various methods of repelling birds, including “zon guns 
 
17 United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1213 (D.N.D. 2012). 
18 Citgo appealed the verdict, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal, reviewing the issues 
de novo, reversed the MBTA convictions, agreeing with the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts 
“that a ‘taking’ is limited to deliberate acts done directly and intentionally to migratory 
birds.” The Fifth Circuit’s decision was “based on the statute’s text, its common law origin, 
a comparison with other relevant statutes, and rejection of the argument that strict liability 
can change the nature of the necessary illegal act.” United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 
No. 14-40128, 2015 WL 5201185, at *9 (5th Cir. Sept. 4, 2015).  
19 Id. 
20 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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(loud cannons), cracker shells (loud shotgun shells) and netting” over 
the pits.21 
Oil companies are not analogous to the schoolboy who hits his 
baseball into a tree and accidentally kills a bird. The schoolboys of the 
world are not going to be held liable under this strict liability regime. 
Vigorous proximate cause analysis coupled with prosecutorial 
discretion will avoid such results. Additionally, it is helpful to point to 
the nearly one hundred years of enforcement history of the MBTA and 
the lack of any such cases being brought.22 On policy grounds, it is 
simply unacceptable to construe the MBTA so as to allow for oil 
companies to get away with causing bird “takings.” It completely 
undermines the express purpose and intent of the Act, which is to 
protect migratory birds from being taken or killed. 
Interpreting the MBTA to criminalize legal corporate conduct not 
aimed at causing harm to migratory birds, is not, as some might argue, 
contrary to the legislative intent or the history of enforcement practice 
of the Act. Additionally, it would not make any activity resulting in the 
death of migratory birds a violation of the MBTA, regardless of 
whether the defendants directed their activity at wildlife.23 
In order for the MBTA to have any meaning, it must be interpreted 
to allow for the sanctioning of private actors like oil companies, whose 
operations are the proximate cause of “takings” and “killings” of 
migratory birds. Congress enacted the MBTA for the preservation of 
migratory bird species. While the text of the statute clearly indicates a 
list of prohibited actions, it is not exhaustive. 
In light of the text of the Act and its purpose and legislative history, 
the MBTA should be read to apply to oil companies engaged in legal, 
permitted activities in order to help ensure the protection of migratory 
birds. Such an interpretation would not put schoolboys at risk of 
criminal liability because vigorous proximate cause analysis, as 
discussed infra Conclusion, would prohibit it and prosecutorial 
discretion, as also discussed infra Conclusion, still serves an important 
role to ensure cases that are brought are carefully selected to advance 
the purpose of the MBTA. 
 
21 Id. 
22 Means, supra note 5, at 824. 
23 Id. 
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A. Statutory Interpretation: History, Text, Purpose 
Any question of statutory interpretation begins with looking at the 
plain language of the statute to discover its original intent. To 
discover a statute’s original intent, courts first look to the words of 
the statute and apply their usual and ordinary meanings. If after 
looking at the language of the statute the meaning of the statute 
remains unclear, courts attempt to ascertain the intent of the 
legislature by looking at legislative history and other sources. Courts 
generally steer clear of any interpretation that would create an absurd 
result which the Legislature did not intend.24 
Other rules of statutory interpretation include reading the statute in 
an internally consistent fashion, ensuring that the particular section of 
the statute at issue is consistent with the rest of the enacted language.25 
The legislature is presumed to act intentionally when including 
language in one section, but not another.26 Courts may also look at the 
common usage of the word and dictionaries, as well as how the word 
or phrase is used in other, related legislation.27 
1. History of the MBTA 
The MBTA was enacted to give effect to a treaty between the United 
States and Great Britain.28 The treaty was “for the protection of 
migratory birds” and arose from the nations “being desirous of saving 
from indiscriminate slaughter and of insuring the preservation of such 
migratory birds as are either useful to man or are harmless”29 The 
United States and Great Britain agreed that “as an effective means of 
preserving migratory birds there shall be established . . . close seasons 
during which no hunting shall be done except for scientific or 
propagating purposes under permits issued by proper authorities.”30 
The expanded convention, which includes Mexico, Japan, and Russia, 
seeks to “protect migratory birds . . . in order that the species may not 
be exterminated” by “employ[ing] adequate measures which will 
 
24 Legal Information Institute, Statutory Construction, Cornell University Law School, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction (last visited Apr. 3, 2015). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 430–31 (1920). 
29 Act of Aug. 16, 1918, 39 Stat. 1702. 
30 Id. at Art. II. “The MBTA has since been amended to implement conventions which 
the United States has signed with Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union.” See Alaska Fish 
and Wildlife Fed’n and Outdoor Council, Inc. v. Dunkle, 829 F.2d 933, 940 (9th Cir. 1987). 
CARUSELLO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2016  11:34 AM 
2015] Can an Oil Pit Take a Bird?: Why the Migratory Bird 95 
Treaty Act Should Apply to Inadvertent Takings and Killings 
by Oil Pits 
permit a rational utilization of migratory birds for the purposes of sport 
as well as for food, commerce and industry.”31 
It is clear from the above-referenced intent that the drafter’s goal of 
the MBTA was to protect migratory birds for a variety of purposes. It 
was envisioned that a regulatory permitting scheme and hunting 
regulations would be a means of achieving the preservation of the 
specified migratory bird species. There is clearly no indication that the 
Act was meant to apply only to hunting; in fact, it is expressly broader 
than that. The MBTA was enacted for the purpose of permitting a 
rational use of migratory birds for sport, food, commerce, and 
industry.32 
The MBTA is a criminal statute making it unlawful, a misdemeanor, 
for persons, associations, partnerships, and corporations to “take” or 
“kill” migratory birds. It is a strict liability offense, meaning that there 
is no “guilty mind” requirement.33 A defendant will be convicted even 
if he was genuinely ignorant of one or more of the factors that made 
the act or omission criminal.34 Misdemeanor convictions still do not 
 
31 Act of Mar. 15, 1937, 50 Stat. 1311 (those measures include close seasons for the 
taking of migratory birds, their nests and eggs, establishment of refuge zones, limits on the 
length of hunting seasons, and the prohibition of killing migratory insectivorous birds except 
when they become injurious to agriculture and constitute plagues). See also United States v. 
Ray Westall Operating, Inc., No. CR 05-1516-MV, 2009 WL 8691615, at 4 (D.N.M. Feb. 
25, 2009). 
32 Id. 
33 See 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (“[A]ny person . . . who shall violate any provisions . . . shall 
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and . . . shall be fined not more than $500 or be 
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”). See also United States v. FMC Corp., 572 
F.2d 902, 906 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[C]ases involving hunters have consistently held that . . . it 
is not necessary that the government prove that a defendant violated [the MBTA’s] 
provisions with guilty knowledge or specific intent to commit the violation.” (quoting 
Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966)); see also United States v. 
Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky. 1939) (finding irrelevant whether defendants 
knew they were violating the statute). 
34 The court in United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 684–85 (10th Cir. 
2010) cited United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 432 (3d Cir. 1986) stating that “[l]ike 
other regulatory acts where the penalties are small and there is ‘no grave harm to an 
offender’s reputation.’” The Supreme Court has long recognized a different standard applies 
to those federal criminal statutes that are essentially regulatory. Id. (relying on Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952)). “Simply stated, then, ‘it is not necessary to prove that 
a defendant violated the Migratory Bird Treaty Act with specific intent or guilty 
knowledge.” Id. at 805 (quoting United States v. Manning, 787 F.2d 431, 435 n.4 (8th Cir. 
1986)). 
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require knowledge, but in 1986 Congress amended the MBTA to 
require that felony violations be committed “knowingly.”35 
This stricter standard helps ensure that criminal liability is applied 
justly; that the schoolboys accidentally harming protected species are 
not punished as criminals. While misdemeanors are still serious crimes, 
proximate cause analysis and prosecutorial discretion work to ensure 
that schoolboys are not prosecuted. The knowledge requirement for a 
felony conviction ensures that punishment is proportionate to the 
crime, and that the actors who act knowingly in violation of the MBTA 
are punished more severely than those who lack the requisite mens rea. 
By including associations, partnerships, and corporations as possible 
defendants, it is evident that Congress intended for the MBTA to reach 
conduct beyond hunting. While it may not have envisioned oil pits as 
sources of takings, it expressly provided that liability could extend 
beyond individuals’ purposeful conduct. In line with its purpose, 
MBTA should be applied to oil companies whose operations of oil pits 
are taking and killing migratory birds. 
The MBTA was made famous in 1920 by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in State of Missouri v. Holland (hereinafter “Holland”).36 The 
Act was then, and continues to be, universally recognized as a 
conservation statute.37 In Holland, the Supreme Court declared the 
protection of migratory birds a “national interest of very nearly the first 
magnitude.”38 This declaration of the importance of protecting 
migratory birds has been used in more recent cases to justify a broad 
 
35 Means, supra note 5, at 823. See 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (West 1998). A “knowing” 
violation, however, may not require specific intent to violate the statute. The Senate report 
states that a defendant must be shown merely to know that his action amounted to a taking 
and that the item taken was a bird. See S. Rep. No. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128; cf. United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that “for a knowing criminal violation of the Clean Water Act, actual knowledge of the 
permit requirement need not be shown”). See generally Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma 
of Mental State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 
1165, 1242 (Fall 1995). 
36 State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
37 Id. See also United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 500 (4th Cir. 
2000); Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999 F.2d 256, 261 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993); 
Newton Cty Wildlife Ass’n v. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 114 (8th Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Mackie, 681 F.2d 1121, 1123 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 
1121 (10th Cir. 2002). 
38 State of Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
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definition of “taking.”39 The interest at stake is the preservation of 
migratory birds. Attributing liability to oil companies, who allow 
migratory birds to get into, trapped, and die in their oil pits, would help 
serve that interest. These cases have also relied on the broader 
definition of “taking” found in the Endangered Species Act,40 which 
will be discussed later in Part III. 
The MBTA extends federal protection to migratory birds covered by 
the four conventions.41 Specifically, section 703 of the MBTA makes 
it unlawful to “hunt, take, capture, [or] kill” any migratory bird 
included in the terms of the Canadian, Mexican, Japanese, or U.S.S.R. 
conventions.42 Those who argue for a narrow reading of the MBTA, to 
include only actions performed for the purpose of taking or killing 
birds, like poisoning, trapping, or hunting, style a type of slippery slope 
argument. 
The argument for a strict, narrow reading of forbidden activity is that 
it prevents an interpretation that leads to absurd results like 
constraining normal land use activities.43 There is an unreasoned fear 
that under a slightly broader interpretation of the MBTA, one that 
would allow liability to be attributed to oil companies, causing the 
death of almost any bird would result in a criminal violation.44 Clearly, 
this interpretation of the MBTA is illogical and against Congress’s 
intent. 
Statutory construction and enforcement, however, are not all or 
nothing constructs. The court in Citgo was correct in applying criminal 
 
39 See Portland Audubon Soc. v. Lujan, No. CIV. 87-1160-FR, 1991 WL 81838, at 6 (D. 
Or. May 8, 1991). See also Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991); 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 (1979). 
40 Id. 
41 Hill v. Norton, 275 F.3d 98 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
42 Fund for Animals v. Williams, 246 F. Supp. 2d 27, 38 (D.D.C. 2003), amended 311 F. 
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Fund For Animals, Inc. v. Hogan, 
428 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
43 See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1576 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
Some regular land use activities result in incidental bird deaths including farming, timber 
harvesting, and brush clearing. 
44 See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510, 529 (E.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d, 
578 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Means, supra note 5. “The Corbin court determined 
that where a single act results in multiple bird deaths, the principle of lenity requires that 
only one violation be charged because it is unclear whether Congress intended to make each 
death a separate violation.” Cf. United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 903 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
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liability to an oil company whose legal, commercial activity was 
resulting in migratory bird deaths. Contrary to what the court in 
Brigham suggested, Citgo did not set a precedent that would allow for 
the schoolboy to be criminally prosecuted. There are limits that can be 
imposed so as to protect migratory birds in line with the purpose of the 
MBTA and still prevent absurd results. 
2. Text: Plain Language, Ordinary Meaning and Dictionary 
Definition, Regulatory Meaning, Contextual Understanding 
a. Plain Language 
Statutory interpretation begins with the language, the actual enacted 
text, of the statute.45 Words and phrases in the text cannot be read in 
isolation. Courts must look to the particular statutory language at issue 
in addition to the language and design of the statute as a whole.46 When 
Congress expresses its will in “reasonably plain terms,” the plain 
language should be conclusive.47 In this case, however, it is not clear 
whether the terms are “reasonably plain” as evidenced by the 
aforementioned disagreements among courts. 
The MBTA makes it unlawful, except as permitted by regulations, 
to “take” or “kill” specified migratory birds or their nests or eggs. The 
current dispute among the courts, where some have interpreted “take” 
to mean only physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and 
poachers,48 while others have interpreted “take” to include activities 
that result in the incidental deaths of birds, like oil pits,49 arose because 
the MBTA does not define the term “take.” 
b. Ordinary Meaning and Dictionary Definition 
Rules of statutory interpretation direct courts to construe terms 
according to their ordinary meaning. For purposes of the MBTA, when 
applied to wildlife, the ordinary meaning of the word “take” refers to a 
“purposeful attempt to possess wildlife through capture, not incidental 
 
45 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Dept. of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 557–58 
(1990); Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 300 (1989). 
46 Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco Prod. Co., 151 F.3d 1251, 1257 (quoting K Mart 
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988)). 
47 Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 151 F.3d at 1256 (10th Cir. 1998). 
48 This is certainly the type of conduct that Congress envisioned when enacting the 
MBTA in 1918. See Newtown Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th 
Cir. 1997); see also Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 703-712 (West 2004). 
49 See United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841 (S.D. Tex. 2012).  
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or accidental taking through lawful commercial activity.”50 The court 
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
deferred to the Department of Interior’s definition of “take” as a 
reasonable interpretation of the MBTA’s plain language.51 
When applied to wildlife, the ordinary meaning of the word “take” 
means removing the wildlife into possession. Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary defines “take” as “to get into one’s hands or 
into one’s possession, power, or control by force or stratagem: . . . to 
get possession of (as fish or game) by killing or capturing”52 This 
definition clearly applies to intentional conduct like trapping and 
hunting; however, it can also apply to conduct not aimed at the removal 
of wildlife into possession. The definition does not indicate any intent 
necessary, rather it simply requires gaining possession by killing or 
capturing, which is precisely what is occurring in the oil pits. 
While the ordinary meaning of “take” as applied to wildlife is 
contrary to the intent of the legislature, it helps explain why Congress 
included “kill” as an alternative. If the plain meaning of “take” as 
applied to wildlife normally refers to purposeful attempts to remove the 
subject from its normal habitat, “kill” then expands this. A killing can 
certainly be incidental or accidental. The oil companies, and the type 
of activity at issue, gain possession of the migratory birds by killing 
them. As aforementioned, the killing does not have to be intentional by 
definition; it can be incidental, an unintended consequence of an 
activity, as it is in the case of the oil pits. When read properly as a 
whole, the prohibition should certainly apply to the oil companies 
whose operations inadvertently “take” and “kill” migratory birds. 
c. Regulatory Meaning 
The regulatory definition of “take” accompanying the MBTA aligns 
with the Webster’s meaning aforementioned. According to the 
accompanying regulations, which recapitulate much of the language of 
the MBTA itself, “[t]ake means to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
 
50 United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012). 
51 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); see 
also United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
52 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) 2329–30 (1986); see also 
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 124 (1904) (“[L]anguage used in a statute which has 
a settled and well-known meaning . . . is presumed to be used in that sense . . .”). 
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trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, 
trap, capture, or collect.”53 
Some courts have argued that the additional action words in the 
regulation’s definition of “take”—“shoot,” “wound,” “trap,” and 
“collect”—help confirm that the meaning of “take” should be confined 
to activity directed at wildlife.54 Some courts have disagreed with this 
assertion that wounding, trapping, and collecting can be done 
unintentionally.55 The above-listed words are often associated with 
hunting, but they can certainly refer to other actions as well. As 
evidenced by the fact that migratory birds are being unintentionally 
taken and subsequently killed by oil pits, taking and killing can be 
unintentional. Oil companies are not setting out to “wound,” “trap,” or 
“collect” birds, but that is what is resulting as a consequence of their 
actions.56 
 
53 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (1997) defines “take” as “to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, 
capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” 
See also Benjamin Means, supra note 5, at 823. 
54 See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1579 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
55 The court in Seattle Audobon Soc’y v. Evans held that the ambiguous terms “take” and 
“kill” in 16 U.S.C. § 703 mean “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and 
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the statute’s enactment 
in 1918.” Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 302 (9th Cir. 1991); Mahler v. 
United States Forest Serv., 927 F.Supp. 1559, 1573–74 (S.D.Ind.1996); Citizens Interested 
in Bull Run, Inc. v. Edrington, 781 F.Supp. 1502, 1509–10 (D.Or.1991); Newtown Cnty. 
Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997). 
56 “The Secretary of the Department of the Interior (“the Secretary”) defines “taking” as 
to “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect.” 50 C.F.R. § 10.12. The 
MBTA, when combined with the Secretary’s definition of “take,” 
prohibits the following types of conduct: pursuing, hunting, capturing, killing, 
shooting, wounding, trapping, collecting, possessing, offering for sale, selling, 
offering to barter, bartering, offering to purchase, purchasing, delivering for 
shipment, shipping, exporting, importing, delivering for transportation, transporting, 
carrying, and receiving. Considering the ordinarily understood meaning of these 
words, only hunting, capturing, shooting, and trapping identify conduct that could be 
construed as solely the province of hunters and poachers. In contrast, pursuing, 
killing, wounding, collecting, possessing, offering for sale, selling, offering to barter, 
bartering, offering to purchase, purchasing, delivering for shipment, shipping, 
exporting, importing, delivering for transportation, transporting, carrying, and 
receiving all constitute acts that may be performed without exhibiting the physical 
conduct normally associated with hunting and poaching. 
United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074 (D. Colo. 1999). 
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d. Contextual Understanding 
“Take” and “kill” in the MBTA are defined in part by the words that 
surround them.57 The other words in the prohibition are often, but not 
exclusively, associated with activities directed at birds. Congress likely 
listed these actions because they all undoubtedly result in the type of 
harm to birds that it sought to prevent; however, the list is not 
exhaustive. To exclude migratory bird deaths that result from oil pit 
operations would undermine Congress’s express goal of preserving 
migratory bird species.58 
Some argue that the prohibition of attempts in the MBTA suggests 
that the Act is not aimed at unintentional conduct, and that it is not 
possible to unintentionally attempt to take a bird.59 However, it is 
important to note that the prohibited attempted actions are in addition 
to the acts, which indicates that Congress meant to prohibit a wide 
range of activities in order to protect migratory birds. Another 
argument for a narrow reading is that punishing unintentional or 
accidental conduct would violate Due Process60 because people are not 
on notice that their conduct may be prohibited. This concern can be 
easily done away with. 
In United States v. FMC Corp., the court concluded that by imposing 
strict liability on FMC Corp. it did not “dictate that every death of a 
bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability on some party.”61 
The court explained that the defendant’s choice to engage in an activity 
involving the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical and its failure to 
prevent that chemical from escaping into a pond and killing birds were 
 
57 “Further, the doctrine of noscitur a sociis does not compel me to conclude that 
Congress intended the word “kill” to serve the same function as the words ‘hunting,’ 
‘shooting,’ and ‘trapping.’” United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n at 1079 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
58 Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory 
Birds and Game Mammals, (Feb. 7, 1986) 50 Stat. 1311. 
59 See 16 U.S.C. § 703 (“attempt to take, capture, or kill”). 
60 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. 
61 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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sufficient grounds to impose strict liability.62 The FMC Corp. court 
reasoned that a construction that would bring every killing within the 
statute, “such as deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass 
modern office buildings or picture windows in residential dwellings 
into which birds fly, would offend reason and common sense.”63 
Courts have long noted that there are alternatives to the strict liability 
regime for actors who are engaging in more “innocent” violations of 
the MBTA. In United States v. Schultze, the court articulated that “[a] 
n innocent technical violation on the part of any defendant can be taken 
care of by the imposition of a small or nominal fine”64 and that these 
situations could be left to prosecutorial and judicial discretion.65 
Similarly, the court in United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 
acknowledged that even under a strict liability standard the government 
still had to prove that the defendant’s conduct constituted both the 
cause in fact and proximate cause of the migratory bird’s death.66 
Requiring the government to prove that the conduct constituted both 
the cause in fact and proximate cause of the taking is a limiting feature 
of the MBTA. It serves to limit both arbitrary and overbroad 
enforcement so that the schoolboys who accidentally hit a bird while 
playing baseball escape liability. 
The MBTA’s language and regulations suggest that Congress 
intended to prohibit conduct beyond that of hunters and poachers. 
Congress prohibited killing, in addition to hunting, shooting, and 
trapping. The MBTA does not appear to be concerned with how the 
bird was taken or killed. 
As the court in Moon Lake notes, the MBTA forbids the sale of 
protected birds regardless of how the birds were obtained.67 Even if a 
bird is found that died of natural causes, its carcass cannot be sold; nor 
may anyone who possesses bird parts lawfully killed before the MBTA 
 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 905. 
64 United States v. Schultze, 28 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Ky. 1939). 
65 Id. Prosecutorial discretion can be problematic in some circumstances; however, when 
dealing with a small nominal fine, there are fewer concerns of abuse and arbitrary 
enforcement. 
66 United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1084 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
67 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2015). See also United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 
F. Supp. at 1074-75. 
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was passed, lawfully sell those bird parts after 1918.68 Additionally, 
Congress did not include any language in the MBTA that suggests that 
it intended to only punish those acting with specific motives.69 In fact, 
by making it a strict liability crime to “take” or “kill” migratory birds 
Congress did away with any possibility of requiring specific motives. 
“Take” and “kill” must be read in conjunction with the phrase that 
precedes them: “by any means or in any manner.”70 This phrase appears 
to be Congress’s attempt to apply liability to more classes of activities. 
If Congress had intended to limit the MBTA’s application to activities 
directed at migratory birds, it did not have to include “by any means or 
in any manner.”71 Evidently, by adding this phrase Congress intended 
for the MBTA to apply to activities beyond hunting and poaching. As 
further evidence, Congress is aware that both private and government 
sectors have interpreted the MBTA as proscribing conduct beyond that 
normally exhibited by hunters and poachers and has done nothing to 
stop that interpretation.72 
While the MBTA certainly proscribes action beyond that directed at 
intentionally harming birds, there are limits. The Supreme Court has 
recognized a strong presumption against criminalizing ordinary 
activities.73 Congress meant for there to be a reasonable limit on the 
 
68 Id. See also Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56, 61–62 (1979) (both the MBTA and the 
BGEPA prohibit commerce in parts of protected birds, without regard to when those birds 
are originally taken). 
69 See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. at 56, 57, 59–60 (1979) (describing the statutory 
prohibitions of the MBTA as “comprehensive,” “exhaustive,” “carefully enumerated,” 
“expansive,” and “sweepingly framed”). 
70 16 U.S.C. § 703 (West 2004). 
71 Id. 
72 See Agricultural Drainage Problems and Contamination at Kesterson Reservoir: 
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the H. Comm. on Interior 
and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong. 10–19, 22–25, 30–39, 42–43, 45–51, 62–65, 104–110, 128–
130, 150–151, 215, 523–524, 525–532, Serial No. 99–3 (1985) (discussing in detail whether 
the Department of Interior violated the MBTA because of its operation of a contaminated 
reservoir in California’s San Joaquin Valley); see also United States v. Moon Lake Elec. 
Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1074–75 (D. Colo. 1999). 
73 See United States v. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994), indicating that the 
Supreme Court would refuse to make a drugstore owner criminally liable merely for 
developing film, even if the film happened to contain images of children engaged in sex 
acts. The Court reached that conclusion despite statutory language most naturally read to 
include drugstore owners and despite the absence of legislative history on point. “We do not 
assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended such results.” See id. at 69 (citing Public 
Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 453-55 (1989)); see also Williams v. United 
States, 458 U.S. 279, 286 (1982) (holding that a statute that prohibited the making of false 
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application of the Act, especially with it being a strict liability offense. 
The legislative history of the MBTA reinforces that understanding. 
Congress could not have been targeting regular farming, timber 
harvesting, brush clearing, and window installation activities. Even if 
the plain meaning of the statute suggested such vast applicability, it 
would not be controlling.74 Congress wanted to stop excessive bird 
deaths occurring from means beyond just hunting.75 
3. Legislation 
a. The Legislative Intent and Purpose of the MBTA 
Even if reasonable minds could differ about the scope of the plain 
meaning of the text of the MBTA, the legislative history of the Act 
makes clear that Congress intended to direct its prohibitions at more 
than purposive conduct toward birds. Congress’s ultimate goal was to 
protect migratory birds from harm. 
The MBTA gave effect to a treaty between the United States and 
Great Britain “for the protection of migratory birds” which arose from 
their “being desirous of saving from indiscriminate slaughter and of 
insuring the preservation of such migratory birds as are either useful to 
man or are harmless”76 The MBTA was enacted in 1918 as a wartime 
 
statements to a bank did not apply to the deposit of a “bad check” because “the 
Government’s interpretation . . . would make a surprisingly broad range of unremarkable 
conduct a violation of federal law”). 
74 See, e.g., Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392, 400 (1966) (quoting United 
States v. American Trucking Assn., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940)). The Court explained: 
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the 
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these 
words are sufficient in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. 
In such cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning has led to 
absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked beyond the words to the 
purpose of the act. Frequently, however, even when the plain meaning did not 
produce absurd results but merely an unreasonable one ‘plainly at variance with the 
policy of the legislation as a whole’ this Court has followed that purpose, rather than 
the literal words. 
75 See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 7374-77 (1918) (debating vociferously which states’ hunters 
would benefit from the MBTA). See also id. at 7360 (statement of Sen. Anthony) (“[T]o my 
knowledge, for the most part, the people who are against this bill are the market shooters, 
who want to go out and kill a lot of birds in the spring, when they ought not to kill them.”). 
For the argument that modern guns require more stringent hunting controls, see id. at 7370 
(statement of Sen. Raker) (“The improvement of guns ha[s] been such that [game birds] can 
be reached in all places, and they are slaughtered promiscuously, many of them for the 
market and shipped away, but many are destroyed just simply for the fun of shooting.”). See 
also Means, supra note 5, at 842. 
76 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920); 39 Stat. 1702. 
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measure for food conservation.77 The sponsoring Senator further 
explained that “[e]nough birds will keep every insect off of every tree 
in America, and if you will quit shooting them they will do it.”78 
The logic was that by reducing the insect population, migratory birds 
would help protect crops and maintain a steady supply of food for the 
wartime effort.79 The National Association of Game and Fish 
Commissioners in a letter read into the Congressional Record, pushed 
Congress to pass the MBTA as a measure to maximize food 
production.80 There appears to be an overall sense of pragmatism 
among the bill’s supporters. 
At the time of the MBTA’s enactment, Congress’s primary concern 
was preserving birds from harm to help farmers and boost food supply. 
While this was the primary concern due to war, Congress surely did not 
mean for the MBTA to be a temporary solution or to allow bird deaths 
resulting from sources other than out-of-season hunters. Out-of-season 
hunters were simply the best example of people who were taking 
migratory birds. It is likely that Congress did not consider oil pit deaths 
in passing the MBTA; however, that does not mean that those deaths 
do not constitute “takings” under the meaning of the Act. 
 
77 55 CONG. REC. 4400 (1917) (statement of Sen. McLean). 
78 Id. at 4816 (statement of Sen. Smith). See also Senator Stedman’s phrasing of the same 
idea: 
[L]et the boll weevil go to rest amidst the happy hunting grounds of his fathers in 
that great and splendid region of our land where he first saw the light. Let his onward 
march of destruction be halted forever, and few there will be, even where the doctrine 
of State rights is most highly cherished, who will lament his departure or criticize 
those who have hastened his funeral obsequies, as is intended by this act, and may 
his allies of the same vicious type likewise share his fate. Let the song bird live to 
herald to the world its happy and joyous anthem proclaiming the goodness of God to 
all his creatures. 
56 CONG. REC. 7362 (1918). See also Means, supra note 5, at 842. 
79 See 56 CONG. REC. 7362 (statement of Sen. Stedman) (“Save the birds which destroy 
the insects and an incalculable service will be rendered to our country by increasing its 
supply of food so imperatively needed to meet the necessities of the war in which we are 
now engaged and to the successful issue of which we have pledged our fortunes, our lives, 
and our honor.”). 
80 See 55 CONG. REC. 4816 (“Whereas the conservation and protection of the migratory 
insectivorous birds is so closely related to the conservation of the food, cotton, and timber 
crops of the country, and the migratory game birds constitute an important source of the 
food supply [T]he said bill is, and should be, considered an important war measure.”) 
(quoting June 13, 1917, resolution of the National Association of Game and Fish 
Commissioners)). 
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Those who advocate for a narrow interpretation of “take,” to include 
only purposive action directed at harming or killing birds, argue that 
interpreting the MBTA to criminalize incidental bird deaths in oil pits 
would be interpreting it in such a way that would make other incidental 
birth deaths that result from legal behavior equally criminal.81 This is 
simply not true considering the history of the MBTA. It is unlikely that 
Congress at this time would have attempted to pass a law so expansive 
as to affect so many ordinary activities.82 
Contemplating the MBTA, Congress was concerned whether it 
would be an invasion of private property rights to allow federal officials 
to conduct warrantless searches of farms and homes for illegally shot 
birds.”83 Surely, the regulation of ordinary land use would have been 
as debated as an invasion of property rights. The regulation of ordinary 
land use is an incredible invasion of privacy, yet was not addressed. 
Congress did not discuss it because it did not intend for the Act to reach 
it. 
Congress’s intention could not have been to regulate ordinary land 
use activities like timber harvesting, lawn mowing, and driving that 
would incidentally take birds. Additionally, the timber industry and 
farming groups supported the MBTA.84 If Congress had intended it to 
be so expansive as to prohibit regular timber harvesting and farming 
activities, the Act would have been against their interest and those 
groups certainly would not have supported it like they did.85 
The legislative history also suggests that Congress intended for the 
MBTA to regulate more than just hunting and poaching.86 At least one 
 
81 See, e.g., Means, supra note 5, at 823. 
82 Earlier court decisions had found laws designed to regulate bird hunting 
unconstitutional. See United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288, 295–96 (D. Kan. 1915) 
(holding that each state has a plenary power over the wildlife within its borders); United 
States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 160 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (“The court is unable to find any 
provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary 
implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game when in a state, and 
is therefore forced to the conclusion that the act is unconstitutional.”) The Supreme Court, 
per Justice Holmes, later upheld the constitutionality of the MBTA. See Missouri v. Holland, 
252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (“We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government 
to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and our crops are 
destroyed.”). 
83 Timber Appellees’ Brief at 30, Newton County Wildlife Assn., 113 F.3d 110, (No. 96-
3463) (citing 56 CONG. REC. 7356–81, 7440–62, 7472–76 (1918)). 
84 Id. 
85 See 56 CONG. REC. 7357–58. 
86 See, e.g., H.R. No. 65–243, at 2 (1918) (letter from Secretary of State Robert Lansing 
to the President) (“[T]he extension of agriculture, and particularly the draining on a large 
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Congressman recognized a difference between the physical acts of 
hunting and killing.87 Other Congressmen construed the MBTA as 
having a very broad scope: 
If the Secretary . . . does not want you to do so, you will never kill 
another duck or any bird protected by this bill, whether it is a game 
bird or not. Therefore, it seems to me that we ought not to adopt the 
bill. It is too far reaching. [T]he bill provides that it shall be unlawful 
to take any bird or have in possession any part of a bird except in 
accordance with regulations adopted by the Secretary. If he adopts 
such regulations, you cannot kill a bird or have any part of a bird in 
your possession. That is all there is to that.88 
This broad scope was further noted by at least two Congressman 
who anticipated application of the MBTA to children who act through 
inadvertence or through accident: 
What are you going to do in a case like this: A barefoot boy, as 
barefoot boys sometimes do, largely through inadvertence and 
without meaning anything wrong, happens to throw a stone at and 
strikes and injures a robin’s nest and breaks one of the eggs, 
whereupon he is hauled before a court for violation of a solemn treaty 
entered into between the United States of America and the Provinces 
of Canada.89 
In response, another Representative noted “Gentlemen conjure up the 
idea that a bureaucracy will be created, and that every innocent boy 
who goes out to play upon the streets and breaks a bird’s egg through 
accident is to be haled 500 miles away and punished as if he were 
 
scale of swamps and meadows, together with improved firearms and a vast increase in the 
number of sportsmen, have so altered conditions that comparatively few migratory game 
birds nest within our limits.”) (referenced by Rep. Baker during the House floor debate, 56 
CONG. REC. 7370 (June 4, 1918)); 56 CONG. REC. 7371 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. 
Walsh: “This act prevents people from killing.”); 56 CONG. REC. 7448 (June 6, 1918) 
(statement of Rep. Robbins: differentiating between the “shooting” of game birds and the 
“destruction” of insectivorous birds); 56 CONG. REC. 7458 (June 6, 1918) (statement of Rep. 
Smith: “If we are going to have a treaty about migratory birds, let us have some place where 
they can come and remain safely and be a pleasure and companions.”). 
87 See, e.g., 56 CONG. REC. 7446 (June 6, 1918) (statement of Rep. Stevenson: “[Rep. 
Bland] says also that they can not hunt ducks in Indiana in the fall, because they can not kill 
them. I have never been able to see why you cannot hunt, whether you kill or not. There is 
no embargo on hunting, at least down in South Carolina . . . .”). 
88 56 CONG. REC. 7364 (June 14, 1998) (statement of Rep. Huddleston); accord 55 
CONG.REC. 4399 (June 28, 1917) (statement of Sen. Reed, describing the MBTA as 
“absolutely prohibiting the killing of game anywhere under any circumstances”). 
89 56 CONG. REC. 7454 (June 6, 1918) (statement of Rep. Mondell). 
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committing an offense of the highest degree, and with all the rigors of 
the criminal law.”90 
It is evident that there is no clearly expressed legislative intent that 
the MBTA is to regulate only physical conduct associated with hunting 
or poaching. Even if the nature of physical conduct prohibited by the 
MBTA were ambiguous, the legislative history of the MBTA supports 
interpreting it to reach conduct of the sort engaged in by oil 
companies.91 Though legislative history may be examined as a 
secondary source of a statute’s meaning, “the weight such history is 
given in construing a statute may vary according to factors such as 
whether the legislative history is sufficiently specific, clear and 
uniform to be a reliable indicator of intent.”92 The legislative history, 
especially coupled with the broad, inclusive language of the text of the 
Act is sufficiently clear to establish that the MBTA proscribes the 
taking or killing of migratory birds, even if those takings or killings are 
not the intended result of the conduct. 
The court in Brigham, after determining that the MBTA is 
ambiguous with respect to the meaning of the term “kill” and its 
application to bird deaths related to commercial activity, looked to the 
history and policy of the Act. The Brigham court concluded that 
“Congress intended to prohibit only conduct directed towards birds and 
did not intend to criminalize negligent acts or omissions that are not 
directed at birds, but which incidentally and proximately cause bird 
deaths.”93 In light of the legislative history aforementioned, the 
Bringham court’s conclusion is clearly too narrow a reading of the 
MBTA. Additionally, the courts conclusion fails to consider the 
substance of the MBTA and its prohibitions on the taking or killing 
hundreds of bird species that are not hunted by humans. 
Congress was unmistakably primarily concerned with hunting; 
however, the statutory language also makes clear that hunting was not 
its sole concern. In determining the criminal liability of a poisoning 
scheme, the court in United States v. Corbin Farm Service, discussed 
 
90 56 CONG. REC. 7456 (June 6, 1918) (statement of Rep. Dempsey). 
91 United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1080–82 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
92 Miller v. C.I.R., 836 F.2d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 1988). 
93 United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1202 (D.N.D. 2012). See 
also United States v. Chevron, No. 09–CR–0132, 2009 WL 3645170 (W.D .La. Oct. 30, 
2009) (rejecting plea agreement with respect to the death of 35 Brown Pelicans entrapped 
in an uncovered oil well caisson because the activity did not constitute a crime under the 
MBTA). 
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how the use of “by any means or in any manner” in section 703 
contradicts the contention that Congress intended to limit the 
imposition of criminal penalties to those who hunted or captured 
migratory birds.94 
Additionally, a number of songbirds and other birds that are not 
commonly hunted are protected by the MBTA. Congress imposed 
criminal penalties on those who kill those birds as well as on people 
who hunt game birds. The Corbin Farm Service court also noted that 
there is no explicit intention of Congress to limit the MBTA so as for 
it not to apply to poisoning.95 This case articulated the proposition that 
Congress intended for the MBTA to apply to more than just hunters, 
holding that the MBTA can constitutionally be applied to impose 
criminal penalties on those who did not intend to kill migratory birds.96 
Notably, the MBTA protects many species that are not considered 
game birds. If the MBTA were to proscribe solely hunting activity, it 
would make no sense for there to be a list of approximately 925 birds, 
many of which have not been traditionally hunted by humans.97 Clearly 
Congress intended to protect all of these species by proscribing more 
than just hunting.98 As one Congressman articulated, “[T]he purpose of 
this bill is to give effect to the convention. . . . Insectivorous migratory 
 
94 See United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d, 578 F.2d 
259 (9th Cir. 1978). 
95 Id. at 532. 
96 Id. See also United States v. Rollins, 706 F. Supp. 742, 745 (D. Idaho 1989) (noting 
that criminal liability could be imposed for the unintentional killing of migratory birds, but 
finding the MTBA did not apply to landowner who inadvertently killed a flock of geese by 
applying a registered pesticide to his fields in the prescribed manner). This case affirms that 
the MBTA is not too broad if read to apply to oil pit deaths. Courts will not interpret the 
MBTA in such a way as to apply criminal liability to individuals engaged in normal land 
use activities. But see North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F.Supp. 332, 361–62 (D.D.C. 
1980), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in a civil 
action to enjoin an oil and gas offshore lease sale that would potentially violate the MBTA, 
the court stated that the MBTA prohibits the killing of birds by any means or in any manner, 
even if the killings were not intentional). 
97 See 50 C.F.R. § 10.13 (listing approximately 925 protected bird species, many of which 
are not game birds and have not been traditionally hunted by humans). 
98 See 56 CONG. REC. 7357 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Fess: “I am in favor of 
protecting the birds. My admiration for our little friends of the air makes me unfriendly to 
the habit of killing off these winged visitors, whether game birds, migratory birds, or other 
species, if they are not nuisances.”). 
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birds as well as migratory game birds are embraced in the terms of the 
treaty.”99 
b. Legislation Related to the MBTA 
Related statutes can often shed light upon a previous enactment.100 
There are several pieces of environmental legislation that work together 
to help implement the national commitment to the protection of 
migratory birds. These include the Endangered Species Act, the MBTA 
which regulates taking and killing, and the Conservation Act, which 
establishes sanctuaries and preserves natural waterfowl habitat.101 
The Endangered Species Act (hereinafter “ESA”) and the MBTA 
use “taking” in ways that may be unequivocal. The ESA, enacted in 
1973, included “harass” and “harm” in its definition of “take.”102 
“Harm” is the broadest term in the ESA. It is not included in the 
regulations under the MBTA. “Harm” is defined by ESA Regulation to 
include habitat modification or degradation.103 “Harm” under the ESA 
definition of “take” means: “an act which actually kills or injures 
wildlife. Such act may include significant habitat modification or 
degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly 
impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or 
sheltering.”104 
In 1974, a year after the enactment of the ESA, Congress amended 
the MBTA and did not modify its prohibitions to include “harm.” The 
Ninth Circuit observed that the fact that Congress did not add 
broadening words such as “harass” and “harm” to the MBTA shows 
that the difference between the two laws is “distinct and purposeful.”105 
This, however, does not stand. The lack of modification to the MBTA 
to include “harm” in 1974 in no way seems to suggest that the MBTA 
regulates only the type of physical conduct normally exhibited by 
hunters and poachers. The 1974 MBTA amendment was ministerial; it 
 
99 56 CONG. REC. 7360 (June 4, 1918) (statement of Rep. Stedman). 
100 Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 62 (1979). 
101 See United States v. North Dakota, 650 F.2d 911, 913-14 (8th Cir. 1981), aff’d, North 
Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300 (1983). See also Means, supra note 5. 
102 An Act to Provide for the Conservation of Endangered and Threatened Species of 
Fish, Wildlife, and Plants, Pub. L. No. 93–205, § 3 (14), 87 Stat. 885 (1973). 
103 Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3.). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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simply recognized the execution of a treaty between the United States 
and Japan.106 
More important to note in the MBTA’s history is that Congress 
reviewed and substantially amended the Act in 1986 and did nothing to 
destroy the legal validity of the holdings of United States v. FMC 
Corp107 which held that the killing of migratory birds by the dumping 
waste water violated the MBTA, and Corbin Farm Serv.108 which held 
that the death of birds resulting from a misapplication of pesticides 
violated the MBTA. Neither of the acts criminalized in the 
aforementioned cases are physical acts normally associated with 
hunting or poaching. 
IV 
DISPELLING CONCERNS: WHY MBTA LIABILITY IMPOSED ON OIL 
COMPANIES WILL NOT LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, OR OVERBROAD ENFORCEMENT 
Those who advocate for a narrow application of MBTA liability fear 
that if liability is imposed on this particular legal commercial activity, 
it will be imposed on all kinds of other legal activities like construction, 
driving, or the schoolboys with baseballs. This slippery slope argument 
does not hold up. Absurd results can easily be avoided by applying a 
vigorous proximate cause analysis. Additionally, prosecutorial 
discretion serves as another limiting feature that plays an important role 
in the determination and application of criminal liability under the Act. 
A. Constitutional and Prosecutorial Discretion Concerns 
Courts have recently expanded the MBTA’s reach.109 Some 
defendants have attempted to argue that the MBTA is violating equal 
protection by being selectively enforced to target large, deep-pocketed 
 
106 See Act of Jun. 1, 1974, Pub.L. No. 93–300, 88 Stat 190 (1974) (acknowledging The 
Convention between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds in Danger of Extinction, and their 
Environment, U.S.-Jap., Mar. 4, 1972, 25 U.S.T. 3329, T.I.A.S. No. 7990). 
107 United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). 
108 United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. Cal.), aff’d, 578 F.2d 259 
(9th Cir. 1978). 
109 See FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 905–08; Sierra Club v. Martin, 933 F. Supp. 1559, 1564–
65; United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp. at 529, 531–36. 
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groups.110 However “the conscious exercise of some selectivity in 
enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation . . .”111 An 
equal protection violation does not exist so long as the selective 
enforcement is not deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard 
such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary classification.112 
1. Constitutional Concerns 
Although section 703 is a strict liability crime, it is important to note 
a few things. First, at common law, crime was a “compound concept” 
consisting of both an “evil-meaning mind” and an “evil-doing hand.”113 
This definition means that a traditional element of criminal violations 
was that the accused have committed the act with intent or knowledge, 
also known as the mens rea.114 Later in the mid-twentieth century, a 
new category of crimes arose in which there was no mens rea 
requirement.115 
In Morissette v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court gave 
a stamp of approval to regulatory crimes that lacked or had a minimal 
mens rea element.116 The Morisette Court reasoned that while the strict 
liability crimes at that time technically did not require mens rea, the 
“accused, if he d[id] not will the violation, usually [wa]s in a position 
to prevent it with no more care than society might reasonably expect 
and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one who 
assumed his responsibilities.”117 Additionally, the “penalties 
commonly [we]re relatively small,” and did not cause “grave damage 
to an offender’s reputation.”118 
 
110 United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1083–84 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
111 Potter v. Murray City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1071 (citing United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 
1351, 1355–56 (10th Cir.1981)). See also United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 782 (10th 
Cir.1980) (“[M]ere failure to prosecute other offenders is no basis for a finding of denial of 
equal protection.”). 
112 U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV; see also Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1073. 
113 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952). 
114 See 1 SUBST. CRIM. L. § 5.5 (2d ed.) (“For several centuries (at least since 1600) the 
different common law crimes have been so defined as to require, for guilt, that the 
defendant’s acts or omissions be accompanied by one or more of the various types of fault.”). 
115 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 2010). 
116 Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251. 
117 Id. at 256. 
118 Id. 
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Due process requires citizens be given fair notice of what conduct is 
criminal. A criminal statute cannot be so vague that “ordinary people” 
are uncertain of its meaning.119 However, when, as in the case of oil 
pits, predicate acts which result in criminal violations are commonly 
and ordinarily not criminal, the court must inquire into fair notice again. 
In the context of laws criminalizing the possession of dangerous items 
such as drugs or explosives, the Supreme Court has stated when items 
have characteristics such that a reasonable person would expect the 
items to be regulated, strict liability for violations of those regulations 
passes constitutional scrutiny.120 Additionally, due process prohibits 
criminalizing acts that the defendant does not cause.121 Causation limits 
criminal sanctions of a defendant’s conduct, whether the conduct 
includes affirmative actions or proscribed omissions.122 
In United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., oil drilling operators were 
charged with violating the MBTA after dead migratory birds were 
discovered lodged in a piece of their oil drilling equipment called a 
heater-treater.123 Defendants appealed, challenging the MBTA, 
claiming: (1) it is not a strict liability crime to take or possess a 
protected bird; or (2) if it is a strict liability crime, the Act is 
unconstitutional as applied to their conduct.124 The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed that the MBTA violations were strict liability crimes, but held 
that a strict liability interpretation of the MBTA for the conduct charged 
could only satisfy due process if the defendants proximately caused the 
harm to the birds.125 The court stated that due process requires criminal 
defendants have adequate notice that their conduct is a violation of the 
Act, and in so noting, affirmed the conviction of one of the 
defendants.126 
 
119 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
120 See United States v. Int’l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564–65 (1971) (“In 
Balint the Court was dealing with drugs, in Freed with hand grenades, in this case with 
sulfuric and other dangerous acids. Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may also be regulated. 
But they may be the type of products which might raise substantial due process questions if 
Congress did not require . . . ‘mens rea.’”). 
121 See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228 (1957) (striking down as 
unconstitutional “where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is 
brought to the bar of justice for condemnation in a criminal case”). 
122 Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 n.3 (1994). 
123 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 682 (10th Cir. 2010). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
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In the Apollo case, the Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter 
“FWS”) notified the defendants that birds were becoming trapped in 
the heater-treaters and dying.127 FWS embarked on an educational 
campaign and provided a grace period where it recommended no 
prosecutions under the MBTA while the educational campaign was 
ongoing. Once the grace period ended, FWS checked on Apollo’s 
heater-treaters and found protected birds lodged in them.128 The court 
found that defendants had sufficient notice, that the MBTA was not too 
vague, and that the defendants failed to take remedial measures to 
ensure the protection of migratory birds. 
2. Prosecutorial Discretion 
Those who advocate for broad applicability of the MBTA suggest 
that prosecutorial discretion can serve as a limiting force.129 This is not 
appropriate.130 There are serious constitutional vagueness concerns 
when prosecutorial discretion is the sole limiting principle in enforcing 
a law. Relying solely on prosecutorial discretion would make MBTA 
enforcement discretion unpredictable and enforcement policies would 
vary dramatically from administration to administration. This volatility 
runs the risk of deterring land use that is important for food production 
and timber supply because people are generally risk averse and will 
avoid the possibility of criminal prosecution by curbing otherwise 
 
127 Id. at 682–83. 
128 Id. at 683. 
129 See, e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that 
where conviction “would offend reason and common sense,” resolution through nominal 
penalties “can be left to the sound discretion of prosecutors and the courts”). See Means, 
supra note 5, at 842,  
While it admittedly seems unlikely that a prosecutor would try a case involving a 
sparrow flying into someone’s kitchen window—though a woman was recently 
prosecuted under the MBTA for giving First Lady Hillary Clinton a “dream catcher” 
made with bird feathers—there are serious practical and theoretical problems with 
relying on prosecutorial discretion. 
 See Alan McConagha, Hillary’s Feathered Gift Gets Plucked: ‘Dream Catcher’ is a 
Nightmare, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at A3; They Swooped, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 
1995, at 27 (“If you are the sort of American who believes the federal government is bird-
brained, here is apparent proof. Peg Bargon, a middle-aged wife and mother in rural 
Monticello, Illinois, faces the possibility of a year in jail and a fine of $156,000 because of 
an eagle feather.”). 
130 See Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373–74 (1964) (“It will not do to say that a 
prosecutor’s sense of fairness and the Constitution would prevent a successful . . . 
prosecution for some of the activities seemingly embraced within the sweeping statutory 
definitions.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 
599 (1967) (“It is no answer to say that the statute would not be applied in such a case.”). 
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desirable behavior.131 Relying solely on prosecutorial discretion would 
make absurd results possible. 
Prosecutorial discretion is also undesirable because it avoids 
statutory interpretation.132 Prosecutorial discretion becomes a means of 
salvaging an overbroad law. Prosecutorial discretion also falls short as 
a solution because not every prosecutor can be relied on to demonstrate 
adequate discretion.133 This may be an acute problem in a pro-
environment climate where, “[e]ach year the Department of Justice 
announces ‘record levels’ of fines imposed, persons indicted, and jail 
time served for infractions of environmental regulations.”134 A 
prosecutor, particularly one with political ambitions, “might allow 
public opinion and potential media coverage” to influence the exercise 
of discretion.135 
Prosecutorial discretion is supposed to do a lot of work in our 
system, but commentators and other courts have overstated the extent 
it is relied on. Despite this overstatement, prosecutorial discretion still 
plays an important role in the criminal law system. It is evident that 
prosecutorial discretion has been a successful tool in the enforcement 
of the MBTA over the course of the last century and that prosecutors 
are selectively and carefully bringing cases. This is illuminated by the 
fact that there are no examples of any absurd cases being brought 
before courts. 
The United States Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”) has 
guidelines designed to assist prosecutors in selecting cases to bring 
when an environmental crime has occurred. The information contained 
in those guidelines is: 
intended to describe the factors that the Department of Justice 
considers in deciding whether to bring a criminal prosecution for a 
violation of an environmental statute, so that such prosecutions do 
not create a disincentive to or undermine the goal of encouraging 
 
131 For an in-depth discussion of the problems associated with prosecutorial discretion, 
see Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969); Kenneth Culp Davis, Police 
Discretion (1975); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 
AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970). 
132 See Mahler v. United States Forest Serv., 927 F. Supp. 1559, 1582 (S.D. Ind. 1996) 
(“[T]rust in prosecutorial discretion is not really an answer to the issue of statutory 
construction.”). 
133 Timothy Lynch, Polluting our Principles: Environmental Prosecutions and the Bill 
of Rights, 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 161, 170 (1996). 
134 Id. at 161. 
135 Id. at 170. 
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critical self-auditing, self-policing, and voluntary disclosure. It is 
designed to give federal prosecutors direction concerning the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in environmental criminal cases 
and to ensure that such discretion is exercised consistently 
nationwide. It is also intended to give the regulated community a 
sense of how the federal government exercises its criminal 
prosecutorial discretion with respect to such factors as the 
defendant’s voluntary disclosure of violations, cooperation with the 
government in investigating the violations, use of environmental 
audits and other procedures to ensure compliance with all applicable 
environmental laws and regulations, and use of measures to remedy 
expeditiously and completely any violations and the harms caused 
thereby.136 
In its guidelines, the DOJ highlights that there are no dispositive 
factors, but that prosecutors should consider voluntary disclosure, 
cooperation, preventative measures and compliance programs, 
pervasiveness of noncompliance, internal disciplinary action, and 
subsequent compliance effort.137 
While historically the majority of the cases that have been brought 
have involved hunting or other similar intentional conduct directed at 
harming birds, some courts have accepted arguments similar to those 
in Citgo for years and the cases being brought now continue to be 
reasoned and carefully selected in accordance with the above 
guidelines. Based on the history of cases brought and the way liability 
has been construed, no overly strict definition of kill is necessary to 
avoid absurd results. If there were a serious problem with the breadth 
of the MBTA or its enforcement discretion, there would be at least one 
schoolboy in a federal penitentiary for taking or killing a migratory bird 
in violation of the Act. 
B. Vigorous Proximate Cause Analysis Avoids Absurd Results 
The MBTA has an inherent and important limiting feature in its 
misdemeanor provision, thus there is no need to rely solely on 
prosecutorial discretion. In order to obtain a guilty verdict under section 
707(a), the government must prove proximate causation (legal 
causation) beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Central to all of the Supreme Court’s cases on the due process 
constraints on criminal statutes is foreseeability—whether it is 
framed as a constitutional constraint on causation . . .and mental state 
 
136 Factors in Decisions on Criminal Prosecutions for Environmental Violations, The 
United States Department of Justice (July 1, 1991), http://www.justice.gov/enrd/3058.htm. 
137 Id. 
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. . . ,or whether it is framed as a presumption in statutory construction 
. . .When the MBTA is stretched to criminalize predicate acts that 
could not have been reasonably foreseen to result in a proscribed 
effect on birds, the statute reaches its constitutional breaking point.138 
Proximate causation is generally defined as: 
that which, in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any 
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which 
the accident could not have happened, if the injury be one which 
might be reasonably anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence 
of the wrongful act.139 
Since the death of a protected bird is: 
generally not a probable consequence of driving an automobile, 
piloting an airplane, maintaining an office building, or living in a 
residential dwelling with a picture window, such activities would not 
normally result in liability under [section] 707(a), even if such 
activities would cause the death of protected birds.140 
Therefore, if the law is properly applied, no absurd results will come 
out of MBTA prosecutions. Activities for which one could foresee the 
unintended result of a migratory bird death would remain innocent, 
while allowing for oil companies who know that their operations are 
killing migratory birds and fail to take adequate remedial measures to 
be appropriately punished. 
Some might argue that if you hit a bird with your car, there is a direct 
and causal link to the bird’s death. What could you possibly expect to 
happen when you hit a bird with the force of a moving vehicle? While 
this is true, it is not reasonably foreseeable that you will hit a bird with 
your car or that bird will fly into the window of your seventh floor 
apartment. These situations occur infrequently and prosecutors are not 
likely to target these incidental deaths. In contrast, if you are out 
hunting for deer and you shoot a bird, that constitutes proximate cause 
because you knew something was going to die when you were firing a 
gun—the objective of the trip was to kill something. Foreseeability is 
a key element, but that argument only comes up when no direct link 
between the conduct and the result exists. Prosecutorial discretion, as 
 
138 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 690 (10th Cir. 2010). 
139 Black’s Law Dictionary, 1225 (6th ed. 1990). 
140 United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1084–85 (D. Colo. 
1999). 
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aforementioned, still plays an important role in determining who is 
susceptible to liability under the MBTA. 
Additionally, other parts of the MBTA and its regulations work to 
avoid absurd results. Section 711 allows “breeding of migratory game 
birds on farms and preserves and the sale of birds so bred . . . for the 
purpose of increasing the food supply.”141 Section 704 authorizes and 
directs the Secretary “to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and 
by what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to 
allow hunting, taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, 
shipment, transportation, carriage, or expert of any such bird.”142 It is 
clear that reasonable regulation by the Secretary of the Interior, along 
with proper application of the law, which includes, as aforementioned, 
under section 707(a), that the government to prove proximate cause 
beyond a reasonable doubt, can effectively avoid absurd and 
unintended results. 
CONCLUSION 
In order for the MBTA to have any meaning it must be interpreted 
to allow for the sanctioning of private actors like oil companies, whose 
operations are the proximate cause of “takings” and “killings” of 
migratory birds. Congress provides a list of activities expressly 
prohibited, but did not indicate that the prohibitions were exhaustive. 
Additionally, including the catchall “by any means or any manner” 
indicates that Congress was not interested in the way in which 
 
141 16 U.S.C. § 711 (2015). 
142 16 U.S.C.A. § 704 (West 2004). In accordance with section 704, the Secretary has 
established when and how migratory birds may be taken, killed, sold, etc. See generally 50 
C.F.R. § 19 (proscribing airborne hunting); 50 C.F.R. §§ 20.1–20.155 (establishing open 
seasons, hunting methods, bag limits, and various other rules for migratory bird hunting); 
50 C.F.R. § 21 (establishing certain permit requirements); 50 C.F.R. § 21.12 (exempting, 
from the permit requirements, the Department of the Interior, state game departments, 
municipal game farms or parks, public museums, public zoological parks, accredited 
institutional members of the American Association of Zoological Parks and Aquariums, and 
public scientific or educational institutions); 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.13–21.14 (exempting captive-
reared mallard ducks and other captive-reared migratory waterfowl); 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.28–
21.29 (permitting falconry); 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.41–21.42 (allowing the issuance of depredation 
orders permitting the killing of migratory game birds “upon the receipt of evidence clearly 
showing that migratory, game birds have accumulated in such numbers in a particular area 
as to cause or about to cause serious damage to agricultural, horticultural, and fish cultural 
interests.”); 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.43–21.47 (permitting the killing of certain depredating larks 
and sparrows in California, Purple Gallinules in Louisiana, jays in Washington and Oregon, 
Double–Breasted Cormorants at aquaculture facilities, and certain blackbirds, cowbirds, 
grackles, crows, magpies anywhere); see also United States v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass’n, Inc., 
45 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1084–85 (D. Colo. 1999). 
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migratory birds were being harmed, simply that the harm was 
occurring. 
There is also no reason to fear overbroad and absurd enforcement, 
as there are built-in mechanisms in the provisions of the MBTA to 
prevent this, as well as court precedent that ensures the right type of 
cases are prosecuted. Congress enacted the MBTA for the preservation 
of migratory bird species. Allowing oil companies’ operations to 
continue to capture and kill birds, albeit inadvertently, is contrary to the 
express purpose of Congress and should not be permitted. 
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